Governance Beyond the Nation-State : Transnationalization and Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region by Kern, Kristine & Löffelsend, Tina
DISCUSSION PAPER   
WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN 
FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
CENTER BERLIN 
 
SP IV 2004-105 
Governance Beyond the Nation-State: 
Transnationalization and Europeanization of the 
Baltic Sea Region* 
Kristine Kern** and Tina Löffelsend*** 
 
*
**
***
An earlier version of this paper appeared in Local Environment, 9 (5), 2004, pp. 451-467. 
Kristine Kern, WZB, E-Mail: <kern@wz-berlin.de> 
Tina Löffelsend, E-Mail: <t.loeffelsend@web.de> 
 
– ii – 
ZITIERWEISE z CITATION 
Kristine Kern and Tina Löffelsend 
Governance Beyond the Nation-State: Transnationalization and 
Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region 
Discussion Paper SPS IV 2004-105, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2004 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany 
Tel.: +49/30/25491-0 z Fax: +49/30/25491-684 
E-mail: <wzb@wz-berlin.de> z Internet: <http://www.wz-berlin.de> 
 
 – iii – 
Abstract 
After the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) developed into a 
highly dynamic area of cross-border cooperation and transnational networking. 
Four types of governance beyond the nation-state are discussed here: 
(1) international regimes, such as the Helsinki Convention for the Protection of 
the Baltic Sea; (2) transnational policy networks, such as Baltic 21, the world’s first 
regional Agenda 21; (3) transnational networks, such as the Union of the Baltic 
Cities (UBC); and (4) the European Union with approaches such as the “Northern 
Dimension” for the development of the Baltic Sea Region. Governance towards 
sustainable development of the Baltic Sea Region undoubtedly requires a combina-
tion of national governance with these governance types beyond the nation-state. 
In this respect, transnational (policy) networks and the European Union provide 
promising new approaches that can complement the traditional forms of interna-
tional and intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states. These new 
governance types represent two parallel trends: a development towards 
(1) transnationalization and (2) the Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region.  
Zusammenfassung 
Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges entwickelte sich die Ostseeregion zu einem 
außerordentlich dynamischen Raum der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation und 
der transnationalen Netzwerkbildung. In dem vorliegenden Artikel werden vier 
Typen der Governance jenseits des Nationalstaates diskutiert: (1) internationale 
Regime wie die Helsinki-Konvention zum Schutz der Ostsee; (2) transnationale 
Politiknetzwerke wie die Baltic 21, die weltweit erste regionale Agenda 21; 
(3) transnationale Netzwerke wie die „Union of the Baltic Cities“ (UBC); und 
(4) die Europäische Union mit Ansätzen wie der „Northern Dimension“ zur 
Entwicklung der Ostseeregion. Governance in Richtung auf eine nachhaltige 
Entwicklung des Osteseeraums erfordert zweifelsohne eine Kombination aus 
nationaler Governance mit diesen Governance-Typen jenseits des Nationalstaats. 
In dieser Hinsicht liefern transnationale (Politik-)Netzwerke und die Europäische 
Union viel versprechende neue Ansätze, welche die traditionellen Formen der 
internationalen und intergouvernementalen Kooperation zwischen National-
staaten ergänzen können. Diese neuen Governance-Typen repräsentieren zwei 
parallele Trends in Richtung auf (1) die Transnationalisierung und (2) die Eu-
ropäisierung der Ostseeregion. 
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1. Introduction 
After the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea Region developed into a highly 
dynamic area of cross-border cooperation and transnational networking. This 
trend was reinforced by the imminent enlargement of the European Union (EU), 
which increased by 10 new members in 2004. As the Baltic Sea is now surrounded 
by EU member states (with the sole exception of Russia), European integration 
appears to offer a real chance to clean up the Baltic Sea which is still endangered 
by pollution.1 EU enlargement resulted in a fundamental change to the governance 
of the Baltic Sea Region, although the new member states in the region had already 
followed the lead set by Brussels and EU policies in the pre-accession phase. 
However, the region is still divided into two parts: while the Nordic countries 
and Germany are considered environmental pioneers,2 Poland and the three Baltic 
republics3 still lag behind European standards and face serious environmental 
problems which can not be solved in the short run. Thus, close cooperation 
between the countries and new forms of governance are necessary for the clean-up 
of the Baltic Sea as a common good and for the sustainable development of the 
entire region (Kindler/Lintner 1993; Swedish Ministry of Environment 2000). 
The aim of this paper is to analyze different types of governance beyond the 
nation-state in the Baltic Sea Region. The following section, 2, discusses the limits 
of national governance and describes four different types of governance beyond 
the nation-state: (1) international regimes, such as the Helsinki Convention for the 
Protection of the Baltic Sea; (2) transnational policy networks, such as Baltic 21, 
the world’s first regional Agenda 21; (3) transnational networks, such as the Union 
of the Baltic cities (UBC); and (4) the European Union with approaches such as 
the “Northern Dimension” for the development of the Baltic Sea Region. These 
new governance types represent two parallel trends: a development towards 
                                                                 
1 See the recently published special report of the German Council of Environmental Ex-
perts on Marine Environment Protection of the North and Baltic Seas. In this report the Council 
states that the seas remain at considerable risk (SRU 2004; cf. Umwelt 4/2004, pp. 204-205). 
2 Environmental policies in the Nordic countries are examined in several volumes; see 
Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000), Joas and Hermanson (1999), Jänicke and Weidner (1997), and 
Andersen and Liefferink (1997).  
3 Most relevant studies concerning the transformation countries in the southern Baltic Sea 
Region concentrate on environmental policy in Poland; see Anderssen (1999, 2002), Bedarff 
(2000), Tews (1999), and Cole (1998). On decentralization and the structures of the environ-
mental administration in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, see Reents, Krüger, and Libbe 
(2002). 
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(1) transnationalization and (2) the Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region. 
Relevant examples and case studies are presented in the subsequent sections. First, 
the different aspects of Baltic transnationalization are discussed in section 3. 
Second, the Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region is analyzed in section 4. In 
the final section, 5, some conclusions are drawn regarding the emerging forms of 
governance in the Baltic Sea Region and the relationship between Baltic transna-
tionalization and Europeanization. 
2. Governance in the Baltic Sea Region 
2.1 The Limits of National Governance 
In the past, environmental policy in the Baltic Sea Region was centered at the level 
of national governance. However, the sustainable development of the region can 
only be guaranteed through a combination of national governance and new modes 
of governance that reach beyond the nation-state. Because the protection of the 
Baltic Sea as a common good is at stake, and because policy approaches as well as 
impacts vary considerably from country to country, different types of cooperative 
policies must be developed and applied systematically. Developments in the Baltic 
Sea Region reflect a general trend towards a new definition of the sovereignty of 
the nation-state and the increasing importance of international organizations and 
regimes, on the one hand, and transnational and sub-national actors, on the other 
(cf. Varwick 1998: 56). However, this is not to say that the nation-state has, or will 
soon, become obsolete. Despite these trends involving the obvious diffusion of 
power, authority, and legitimacy to other government levels and actors, the role of 
the nation-state remains crucial.4  
However, the importance of national government and governance in the Baltic 
Sea Region has declined. It is now defined and executed in new modes and ar-
rangements beyond the nation-state. Generally speaking, such new governance 
arrangements involve the transfer of national authority in three directions: up-
wards, to the level of international and supranational institutions; sidewards, to 
                                                                 
4 Nation-states themselves have also undergone changes, for example, from interventionist 
to enabling modes of governance (cf. Peters/Pierre 2001: 131; cf. Hooghe and Marks 2003: 241).  
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civil society actors; and downwards, to sub-national actors (cf. Rosenau 1999: 
293).5  
So, how do these concurrent trends look, specific to the Baltic Sea Region? 
First, responsibilities are already being increasingly reassigned to international and 
supranational institutions. After the end of the Cold War many new international 
and intergovernmental institutions such the Council of the Baltic Sea States were 
created, and existing institutions such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) 
gained momentum. These early-1990s developments were superseded by a com-
prehensive Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region, which began in the mid-
1990s. The European Union became the most important international actor in the 
region due to EU enlargement.  
Second, many tasks which previously came under the authority of national 
governments were transferred from governmental to non-governmental actors. 
Such transfers continue and can be observed within nation-states and at interna-
tional level where transnational policy networks (cf. Benner/Reinicke/Witte 2003) 
and public-private partnerships (cf. Hamm 2002; Wolf 2003) have emerged in 
recent years.  
Third, since the early 1990s, government reforms have played an important 
role in the Baltic Sea Region, especially among the former socialist countries. Local 
and regional self-governance was reinstated in Poland, the three Baltic Republics, 
and Russia. Decentralization and the devolution of authority have strengthened the 
position of sub-national entities and increased local capacities in these countries 
(Reents/Krüger/Libbe 2002; Dorsch 2003).6  
In sum, therefore, there appear to be two clear and strong tendencies: 
(1) towards the transnationalization of the Baltic Sea Region, because tasks are 
transferred from governmental to non-governmental and sub-national actors, and 
(2) towards the Europeanization the Baltic Sea Region.  
                                                                 
5 On this “triple devolution”, see also Rosenau (1995: 39; 1997: 31); compare Pierre and 
Peters (2000: 83ff.), and Voelzkow (2000: 281ff.). 
6 An overview on all international, intergovernmental, European, transnational, and sub-
national organizations active in the Baltic Sea Region is provided by Suominen, Antola, and 
Haukala (2000); cf. Voß (1999). 
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2.2 Types of Governance beyond the Nation-State 
The emergence of various new forms of international, intergovernmental, suprana-
tional, and transnational governance in the Baltic Sea Region (cf. Jann 1993) was 
triggered by three developments that involved all levels of government and a wide 
range of policy areas: (1) the end of the Cold War, which led to the establishment 
of new transnational and sub-national actors, followed by the transformation 
processes in the former socialist countries, which were aided primarily by the 
Nordic countries; (2) the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 which triggered the implementation of Agenda 
21 (UN 1992: 3) and introduced more integrative and participatory approaches; 
(3) increasing European integration, the product of two waves of enlargement in 
1995 (Sweden and Finland) and 2004 (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) 
leading to the Europeanization of the entire region. The Helsinki Convention, an 
international regime which had been in place long before the end of the Cold War, 
was complemented by transnational (policy) networks and superseded by the 
Europeanization of the whole region.  
Governance by international regimes and intergovernmental cooperation 
Governance by international regimes and intergovernmental cooperation, the first 
type of governance discussed here, are the traditional forms of governance beyond 
the nation-state. Traditionally, cross-border environmental cooperation is gov-
erned by international regimes and institutions agreed upon and coordinated by 
nation-states. International regimes and intergovernmental cooperation in the area 
of environmental policy have played an important role since the 1970s.7 Nation-
states are still the dominant actors; NGOs and sub-national actors are not directly 
involved in decision-making. In recent years, however, such organizations have 
obtained observer status, although decision-making is still restricted to representa-
tives of nation-states (Oberthür et al. 2002). For this type of governance the 
governance mode is self-organization among nation-states combined with hierar-
chical implementation strategies within nation-states. This classic model presup-
poses a strong nation-state capable of implementing international agreements at 
                                                                 
7 Regarding the most important international environmental regimes, see Held et al. (1999: 
391 ff.), Biermann (1998), Gehring and Oberthür (1997), Young (1997), and List (1997); on the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes, cf. in particular Young (1999). 
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sub-national level. The success of this model depends on national capacities to 
induce changes at sub-national level to solve existing environmental problems.  
Even during the Cold War period, cooperation between nation-states across 
the Baltic Sea was comparatively close, particularly in the area of environmental 
policy (Bruch 1999: 68-69). The Helsinki Convention on the “Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area”, signed in Helsinki in 1974, is an 
excellent example of this cooperation.8 Nevertheless, up to the end of the 1980s, 
the situation in the area was clearly dominated by national governance and the 
repercussions of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, intergovernmental 
cooperation increased rapidly. Examples of intergovernmental cooperation include 
the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS),9 founded in 1992, which aims to 
strengthen cooperation and coordination between the countries in the region; and 
Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic 2010 (VASAB 2010),10 an intergovern-
mental program of the countries in the Baltic Sea Region in the area of spatial 
planning and development.  
Governance by transnational policy networks in the Baltic Sea Region 
Governance by transnational policy networks, a new type of governance, has 
emerged in recent years. Such policy networks incorporate actors from govern-
ment, business associations, NGOs, and local government organizations (LGOs). 
In contrast to the first type of governance discussed above, such networks are 
characterized by the integration of stakeholders in policy-making. Governmental, 
non-governmental, and sub-national actors play similar roles within such transna-
tional policy networks, because all actor groups are involved in decision-making 
and policy implementation. The mode of governance changes because this kind of 
self-organization encompasses different actor groups. The change in decision-
making results in the adoption of a different implementation model. Implementa-
tion is not restricted to national governmental regulation, but depends upon the 
initiatives of sub-national and non-governmental actors.  
                                                                 
8 For general information on HELCOM, see Ehlers (2001), Swedish Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (2000), Poutanen and Melvasalo (1995), and Kindler and Lintner (1993). 
9 For further information on the CBSS, see Stalvant (1999), and Hubel and Gänzle (2002). 
10 For recent developments and further information on VASAB 2010, see, for example, 
VASAB (2001), and  Görmar (1997). 
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In the early 1990s, the massive environmental problems in the former socialist 
countries became obvious and reached the regional political agenda. Therefore, 
major regional cooperation efforts focused on environmental policy and sustain-
able development. International and intergovernmental cooperation increased 
rapidly during this period. In 1996, four years after the Rio Summit, the Council of 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS) finally initiated an integrative and participatory Agenda 21 
process for the whole region (Baltic 21) which encompasses various policy sectors 
(such as agriculture or transport) and involves a large number of stakeholders.  
Governance by transnational networks in the Baltic Sea Region 
The emergence of governance by transnational networks, another new form of 
governance, is not directly related to international cooperation between nation-
states, as it is a form of governance excluding (national) governmental actors. In 
the case of transnational networks, decision-making takes place in network organi-
zations of non-governmental and sub-national actors. This mode of governance 
can be characterized as the self-organization of such actors. The implementation 
of internal decisions among civil society actors or networks of local authorities 
depends on internal network governance. Since hierarchy cannot be adopted as an 
internal mode of governance, new governance instruments such as benchmarking 
have been developed and applied.  
The emergence of numerous transnational networks in the Baltic Sea Region 
after the end of the Cold War is striking. Development in this region appears to be 
more dynamic than in other parts of Europe. A variety of transnational civil 
society organizations (e.g., the Coalition Clean Baltic, Social Hansa, etc.), economic 
organizations (e.g., Baltic Sea Chamber of Commerce Association), or sub-national 
organizations (e.g., the Union of the Baltic Cities) were founded after the end of 
the Cold War, developed very successfully, and have begun to influence other 
governance types in the Baltic Sea Region. Self-governance by transnational 
networks developed as one of the new modes of governance and prompted a 
fundamental change of governance in the region.  
Governance by the European Union 
European integration replaced national governance by multi-level governance 
causing political actors to interact across the different levels of government. This 
development even encompasses the establishment of direct relations between the 
European Union as a supranational body and networks of local and regional actors 
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such as the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC), a phenomenon typical of EU multi-
level governance (cf. Jordan 2001: 200).  
The European Union has increasingly become a very important actor in the 
Baltic Sea Region. The Europeanization of the region gained momentum after the 
end of the Cold War, with the third EU enlargement in 1995, when Sweden and 
Finland joined. Another wave of integration and convergence started in the region 
when the European Union agreed to its fourth and latest, the Eastern, enlarge-
ment. EU influence increased during the pre-accession phase of the fourth 
enlargement, which ended in May 2004 when the three Baltic Republics and 
Poland became full EU member states. So, within the last 10 to 15 years the 
situation in the Baltic Sea Region has changed completely; in the late 1980s the EU 
had no presence in the region because Denmark and West Germany were the only 
EU members at that time. 
The Baltic Sea can be considered as a link between old and new EU member 
states. Today, the governance of the Baltic Sea Region is becoming more and more 
embedded in European multi-level governance. It is already evident that most 
governmental and non-governmental actors in the Baltic Sea Region orient them-
selves towards Brussels. This situation supports the convergence of all national 
initiatives around the Baltic Sea towards sustainable development. The EU devel-
oped its own approaches and policy instruments for the Baltic Sea Region, for 
instance, funding programs such as INTERREG or TACIS. Today, EU regula-
tions and EU funding shape the socio-economic and political development of the 
whole region. 
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Table 1  
Types of Governance beyond the Nation-state in the Baltic Sea Region 
Governance by Examples Actors and modes of governance 
International regimes 
Intergovernmental coopera-
tion 
Helsinki Convention 
Council of Baltic Sea States 
Governmental actors 
Self-organization of nation-states 
Hierarchical implementation strategies 
within nation-states 
Transnational policy 
networks Baltic 21 
Governmental, non-governmental, 
and sub-national actors 
Self-organization of different actor groups 
Participatory implementation 
Transnational networks Union of the Baltic Cities, Coalition Clean Baltic 
Non-governmental and sub-national actors 
Self-organization of non-governmental 
and sub-national actors 
Implementation by internal network governance 
Supranational institutions European Union 
EU as actor 
European multi-level governance 
Implementation by nation-states and 
the recipients of EU funding 
 
3. The Transnationalization of the Baltic Sea Region 
3.1 Governance by International Regimes: The Helsinki Convention 
In the countries neighboring the semi-enclosed Baltic Sea insight into the necessity 
of joint efforts was gained at a comparatively early stage. The process for establish-
ing a common framework for environmental protection in the Baltic Sea Region 
started with two conferences in Visby (Sweden) in 1969 and 1970. However, the 
situation opposed the establishment of an international agreement between coun-
tries from the two antagonistic blocs. Closer regional cooperation in this area only 
became possible after the rapprochement of the two Germanys.11 Thus, Finland 
                                                                 
11 This was a result of Foreign Minister/Chancellor Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik (eastern policy), 
which pushed for political and practical rapprochement towards the German Democratic Repub-
lic (GDR), and culminated in the signing of the Grundlagenvertrag (Treaty on the Basis of Intra-
German Relations) in December 1972. 
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offered to host a conference for the protection of the Baltic Sea at the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. One year later, in May 1973, a 
multinational expert meeting convened in preparation for the “Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea” in Helsinki. 
In March 1974, the “Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea Area” — commonly referred to as the Helsinki Convention — was 
signed by seven states12 (Fitzmaurice 1992: 47-50). The ratification process ended 
in 1980 and the Convention came into force in May of that year. In the context of 
the Convention, it was decided that a governing body be created, so the Helsinki 
Commission (HELCOM) was established (Bruch 1999: 73). In 1992, the Conven-
tion was revised, updated (e.g., concerning the list of harmful substances), and 
broadened in scope (e.g., now also encompassing inland waters, coastal zone 
management, and biodiversity), making it more appropriate to the new political 
situation in the Baltic Sea Region after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The new 
convention was signed by all of the nine states13 that border the Baltic Sea and by 
the European Community. It is a legally binding international treaty. 
The Helsinki Convention is exemplary in character. During the Cold War era, 
it stood out as a shining example of East-West cooperation and a symbolic exer-
cise in peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, apart from its geopolitical significance, 
it was the first framework convention to encompass all aspects of the maritime 
environment and its protection,14 and it remains outstanding in its scope today 
(Bruch 1999: 159). The Helsinki Convention regulates pollution “from land or 
coast, waterborne or airborne, originating from the operations of ships, from 
pleasure craft, from sea bed activities, or from any other heterogeneous disposal at 
sea of wastes or other matters” (Fitzmaurice 1992: 53). In terms of general princi-
ples it incorporates the precautionary and the polluter-pays principles, promotes 
best environmental practices and best available technologies, environmental 
monitoring (of emissions), and the avoidance of risks (to health and the environ-
                                                                 
12 The signatories were Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German 
Democratic Republic, Poland, Sweden, and the USSR.  
13 Signatories to the revised Helsinki Convention of 1992 included all of the original con-
tracting parties, with the reunited Germany legally succeeding the former FRG and GDR, plus the 
newly independent Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
14 Previous agreements existed, which focused on specific aspects of maritime pollution 
sources, however, the Helsinki Convention was the first comprehensive treaty (cf. Bruch 1999: 70 
and 72). 
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ment).15 In addition, the contracting parties commit themselves to implementing 
national protection measures and to engaging in international cooperation. Thus, 
they “individually or jointly take all appropriate legislative, administrative or other 
measures to prevent and eliminate pollution” (responsibility principle).16 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) is responsible for the coordination of 
intergovernmental activities. It is supported by a secretariat in Helsinki. The 
Commission meets annually and also holds occasional ministerial meetings. 
Chairmanship rotates every two years among the contracting parties in alphabetical 
order. HELCOM recommendations are adopted unanimously and, although not 
legally binding, they must be taken into account in national legislation and envi-
ronmental programs. The purely advisory nature of HELCOM’s decisions has not 
proved an obstacle in the past. Instead, what has emerged is that national capaci-
ties (financial resources, in particular) and political will are the decisive factors for 
implementing HELCOM resolutions (Bruch 1999: 93). In addition to the signato-
ries, 18 international non-governmental organizations have observer status in 
HELCOM. These include the International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI), the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC), Coalition Clean Baltic 
(CCB), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).  
There are five working groups responsible for the handling of particular prob-
lems or sources of pollution.17 The Commission and its working groups manage 17 
different projects, ranging from the maintenance of databases on hazardous 
substances and the development of measures for the preservation of the sturgeon 
population to reviewing the risks posed by oil spills. The Monitoring Group 
(HELCOM MONAS) and the Land-based Pollution Group (HELCOM LAND) 
publishes a report on the overall pollution load of the Baltic Sea every five years.  
Of particular interest is the “Programme Implementation Task Force” (PITF), 
responsible for the coordination of measures and activities in connection with the 
“Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme” (JCP). This 
program sets the environmental management framework for the long-term 
                                                                 
15 <http://www.helcom.fi/helcom.html> accessed on 19 September 2004. 
16 <http://www.helcom.fi/helcom.html> accessed on 19 September 2004. 
17 The working groups are HELCOM MONAS (Monitoring and Assessment Group), 
HELCOM LAND (Land-based Pollution Group), HELCOM MARITIME (Maritime Group), 
HELCOM RESPONSE (Response Group), HELCOM HABITAT (Nature Conservation and 
Coastal Zone Management Group). 
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restoration of the ecological balance in the Baltic Sea.18 The JPC was established 
(together with the revised Helsinki Convention) in 1992 as the implementing agent 
whose task it is to reduce the Baltic Sea’s pollution load; the JCP’s mandate will 
run for 20 years. In terms of measures prescribed by the JCP, the emphasis is on 
investment in environmentally friendly technologies and the elimination of so-
called “hot-spots” in the region. The elimination of the 132 identified pollution 
sources (hot-spots) is an issue of primary importance. 
HELCOM PITF projects often require cost-intensive investments (technology 
and infrastructure), on the one hand, and the collaboration of stakeholders, on the 
other. Accordingly, the PITF consists not only of representatives from the con-
tracting parties to the Helsinki Convention, but also of spokespersons from 
international financial institutions, and governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.  
In 2000, the PITF started to organize regional workshops, convening stake-
holders (national, regional, and local authorities, owners of hot-spots, international 
financial institutions, and NGOs) for the purpose of developing plans of action 
and allocating financial resources to tackle pressing environmental problems in 
designated areas. Workshops were held in most of the Baltic Sea states up to 2002, 
and HELCOM attributes a generally positive cost-benefit ratio to the workshops 
(HELCOM 2001: 14). Between 1992 and 2001, 26 municipal and industrial hot-
spots were eliminated mainly through closures or production cuts at industrial 
plants. This number increased to around 50 in the intervening period, because 
further hot-spots were eliminated.  
The initiatives of the Helsinki Convention since the early 1980s and the 
approximately 200 recommendations issued by HELCOM since then have contri-
buted in particular and substantially to the improvement of the maritime environ-
ment in the region. The main achievements can be seen in the reduction of emis-
sions and hazardous substances by at least 50%19 (primarily due to the elimination 
of hot-spots), the adoption of stricter regulations for industrial emissions, the 
enactment of new legislation for the prevention of pollution by maritime traffic, 
the implementation of measures to avert illegal oil spills, and the improvement of 
                                                                 
18 <http://www.helcom.fi/helcom/groupstaskforce/helcompitf.html> accessed on 19 Sep-
tember 2004. 
19 These statistics were provided by HELCOM itself (cf. <http://www.helcom.fi/ 
pollution/hazardous.html#achievements> accessed on 19 September 2004). 
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regional environmental monitoring and assessment. However, many sources of 
contamination remain, which are still polluting the Baltic environment with nutri-
ents and hazardous substances. Intensive agriculture, inadequate municipal and 
industrial wastewater treatment facilities, oil spills, and industrial discharges still 
pose major threats to the Baltic environment (VanDeveer 1999: 13; HELCOM 
2002: 1, 15).  
HELCOM has extended its activities significantly over the decades. It received 
much praise for its solid cooperation in environmental matters, but its expansion 
in this area also prompted criticism from NGOs who blamed HELCOM for being 
“too large, expensive, and slow to act” (VanDeveer 1999: 13). Around 40 to 50 
meetings per year, which often lasted for several days, consumed much of the 
participants’ time and resources. This has been a serious hurdle to smaller NGOs’ 
ability to participate, and it may explain why only larger, international NGOs and 
other umbrella organizations are represented in HELCOM. 
The most important obstacle to environmental policy implementation is 
probably the lack of capacities in the transition states. In these states, a combina-
tion of public sector performance deficits and a generally lower-level awareness of 
environmental problems places serious constraints on policy implementation. 
HELCOM recognizes that some progress has been made, for example, in the 
Baltic States, but fundamental problems remain to be resolved in Russia. Thus, to 
be effective, HELCOM must adopt a three-dimensional approach that focuses on 
capacity building with respect to human resources (training of personnel), devel-
opment of the public sector (reforming bureaucracies and institutions), and raising 
of public awareness (VanDeveer 1999: 10). HELCOM has acknowledged the need 
for these priorities and is focusing its PITF efforts in this direction.  
In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of tasks,20 HELCOM has recently 
made efforts to harmonize and consolidate its regulations and activities with those 
of other international regimes and organizations. HELCOM is currently working 
to bring its recommendations into line with OSPAR21 resolutions and recommen-
dations. In 2000, a joint Baltic 21/HELCOM working group was established to 
                                                                 
20 <http://www.helcom.fi//helcom/projectsmeetings.html#harmonisation> accessed on 
19 September 2004. 
21 “The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East At-
lantic”, short OSPAR Convention, replaced the Oslo and Paris Conventions and entered into 
force in 1998 (cf. <http://www.ospar.org> accessed on 19 September 2004). 
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coordinate the often overlapping activities of both organizations. Finally, 
HELCOM has begun to try to harmonize its regulations with EU regulation — an 
aim that is becoming increasingly more significant.22  
HELCOM’s enhanced cooperation with the non-governmental sector, particu-
larly in project-based collaboration, is a sign of a shift in its policy: the inter-
governmental level alone is no longer recognized as sufficient for the successful 
implementation of environmental policy. To create awareness, legitimacy, and 
acceptance of decisions requires the participation of societal actors. HELCOM’s 
gradual opening up to civil society actors and other stakeholders represents a 
response to this requirement and marks the advent of a relaxation, to some extent, 
in the strict hierarchical order of this international regime which has heretofore 
dealt exclusively with governmental actors. 
3.2 Governance by Transnational Policy Networks: Baltic 21 — 
An Agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea Region 
Transnational policy networks have a different structure than international regimes 
insofar as such networks involve a variety of actors ranging from nation-states to 
civil society. Policy networks can facilitate cooperation between different partners 
in a certain policy field, e.g., sustainable development, by promoting a common 
agenda. Equality among the participating stakeholders is a prerequisite and 
acknowledges the importance of all participating levels for the successful 
implementation of the policy agenda.  
The formation of Baltic 21 was initiated as a result of the adoption of Agenda 
21 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. Baltic 21 was an initiative of the Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS); the heads of state and governments of CBSS member countries decided 
together with the EU on the development of a regional Agenda 21 for the Baltic 
Sea Region. The Agenda process was officially launched in 1996. A wide range of 
actors were involved in drafting sectoral reports as part of the development of the 
Agenda’s program. These reports constituted the background for the Baltic 
                                                                 
22 To this end, a Joint Ministerial OSPAR/HELCOM Conference on the Protection of the 
Baltic and North-East Atlantic was held in Bremen, Germany in 2003 (HELCOM Press release, 
5 June 2003; Umwelt, 9/2003: 498 f.). 
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Agenda 21, which was adopted by the CBSS Foreign Ministers two years later (see 
Baltic 21, 1998: 4).23  
The Agenda initiative involves all countries surrounding the Baltic Sea (plus 
Norway and Iceland). The process is supported by a small secretariat in Stockholm 
that operates as a unit of the CBSS Secretariat. It has two staff members plus a 
consultant for specific priority projects. Procedural steering is carried out through 
the Senior Officials Group (SOG) that comprises some 40 parties,24 including 
representatives from national ministries, the European Commission (DG Envi-
ronment), intergovernmental organizations (e.g., HELCOM, the International 
Baltic Sea Fishery Commission, or Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic 2010), 
international financial institutions, (e.g., the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development or the World Bank), international sub-state and city networks 
(e.g., the UBC or ICLEI), international business networks (e.g., World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, International Chamber of Commerce), 
international academic networks (Baltic University Programme), and international 
environmental non-governmental organizations (e.g., Coalition Clean Baltic and 
the WWF). 
The wide range of representatives in the SOG reflects one of the principles 
adopted by the Agenda process, namely, to be inclusive and open.25 Despite this 
aim, however, civil society representatives are largely outnumbered by governmen-
tal and other institutional actors. Further, the SOG presidency rotates (every two 
years) only between countries and the EU. The SOG plenum elects a chairperson 
to head, and representatives from four countries to operate its Bureau, whose task 
it is to assist the SOG Chairperson and Secretariat. At present, the members of the 
Bureau are all government representatives from ministries. 
Baltic 21 strives to assist the countries of the Baltic Sea Region in their efforts 
to achieve sustainable development; but primary responsibility lies with the states 
themselves, who must ensure that the Baltic 21 goals are streamlined in accordance 
                                                                 
23 Information concerning the organizational structure, working program and activities 
within the framework of Baltic 21 can also be found on the official website: <http://www.baltic 
21.org> accessed on 19 September 2004. 
24 <http://www.baltic21.org/?organisation,2>  accessed on 19 September 2004. 
25 Any organization which is active in at least half of the Baltic 21 countries, which has 
competencies in a relevant field, and which is willing to contribute to the Agenda process can 
become a member of the SOG; see <http://www.ee/baltic21/network/sog_membership_criteria 
.htm> accessed on 19 September 2004.  
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with national policies (Baltic 21 2003: 8). Baltic 21 is designed as a long-term 
project for sustainable regional development. The time frame for Baltic 21 is five 
years, but the entire process is projected for a duration of 30 years, and it will go 
beyond environmental protection, encompassing the economic and social spheres 
as well. Seven sectors of the economy — namely, agriculture, energy, fisheries, 
forests, industry, tourism, and transport — and, since 2000, education have been 
identified as priority areas for planned collaborative activities in accordance with 
the Baltic 21 Action Programme. Cooperation was also established in the area of 
spatial planning. The Baltic 21 Action Programme (which complements the strate-
gic part of Baltic 21 and which was adopted at the same time) lists thirty potential 
activities, primarily related to structural development and enhanced regional 
cooperation. 
For each sector or area of priority, indicators were established, goals and time-
frames set, and plans of action developed. The supervision of each sector or area is 
the responsibility of one or two SOG members, so-called “Lead Parties”. All of 
the Lead Parties are countries or intergovernmental bodies like the International 
Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC).  
In June 2003, the periodic report of 2003, “Baltic 21 Report 2000-2002: To-
wards Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region”, was released, which 
reviews and evaluates the Baltic 21 activities up to that time.26 According to this 
report, measures taken in the various sectors include assessment studies, network-
ing between responsible or affected regional actors, and the development of 
guidelines or concepts (e.g., for fisheries or forestry). Other sectors such as indus-
try and tourism have concentrated on the promotion of environment-friendly 
production or certification schemes. All sectors have been active in trying to 
establish links between respective stakeholders and in promoting exchange (see 
Baltic 21, 2003: 11-20). The report specifically mentions 11 real projects which 
have been implemented so far under the auspices of Baltic 2127; these projects deal 
with concrete problems in the industrial sector (9 projects), spatial planning (1), 
                                                                 
26  For further information on the achievements of Baltic 21 see also the periodic report of 
2004, “Five Years of Regional Progress Towards Sustainable Development: A Baltic 21 Report to 
the Prime Ministers of the Baltic Sea States”. 
27 “A project is considered labeled as a Baltic 21 project when it complies with the Baltic 21 
objectives and has been [formally] adopted …, i.e. has received a letter of understanding, express-
ing the Baltic 21 endorsement of the project, by the appropriate sector meeting or by the SOG or 
its Bureau.” <http://www.ee/baltic21/projects.htm> accessed on 3 June 2003. 
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and transport (1). Funding for these activities has been provided mostly by na-
tional agencies and governments, EU structural funds (INTERREG IIIB, 
PHARE, LIFE), and the business community.  
In addition to the sectoral activities, Baltic 21 is also involved in “Joint 
Actions” (JAs), targeting cross-sector issues. At present there are seven such 
actions, each of which has one responsible actor who initiates and manages the 
common activities (see Baltic 21, 2003: 1-2). The picture concerning the imple-
mentation of JAs is equally mixed: while some are still only developing, others 
have already embarked on the implementation of their agenda. For example, JAs 3 
and 5, “Demonstration Areas and Pilot Projects” and “Procurement of Technol-
ogies”, have not gone beyond an initial screening process for the evaluation of 
potential for future actions, while JA 4, “City Co-operation and Sustainable Devel-
opment Issues in Cities and Communities”, is considered particularly successful. 
The joint initiative is coordinated by the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC). Building 
on its ongoing work in the area of environmental cooperation at local level, the 
UBC completed 11 cooperative projects between 2000 and 2002; these activities 
were carried out within the UBC’s own “Agenda 21 Action Programme” and 
involved three quarters of its member cities. The projects encompassed different 
approaches to sustainable urban development, for instance, environmental man-
agement or best practice exchange. The 2003 Baltic 21 assessment report refers to 
this success and the UBC’s contribution to the integration of Baltic sustainability 
initiatives into similar processes at European and international level. Consequently, 
Baltic 21 (2003: 23) demands that resources for activities be transferred from 
national to local level. 
The first Baltic 21 Biennial Report (2000) mainly noted that activities were still 
in an initial kick-off phase one-and-a-half years after the adoption of the Agenda. 
The 2003 assessment report paints a mixed picture of developments. Generally, 
however, it is not over-enthusiastic about the achievements of the Baltic Agenda 
process. Acknowledging the general goodwill of all parties, it acknowledges differ-
ences between sectors: progress has been made in energy, fisheries, industry, and 
spatial planning. Some progress was noted for forestry, and a “good start” recog-
nized for Baltic 21 activities in education; tourism, agriculture, and transport lag 
behind. Agriculture, tourism, and fisheries were identified as notoriously not well-
sustained sectors where much action is still required. Thus, the fact that the 2003 
report identifies two of these problematic sectors as belonging to the group of 
laggards in Baltic 21 must be interpreted as a special challenge. In terms of the 
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main obstacles to the success of Baltic 21, the report identifies a lack of commit-
ment in some of the responsible ministries (Baltic 21, 2003: 4-5). Since the overall 
success of the Agenda largely depends on resources provided by nation-states and 
measures implemented by them, this is a crucial factor. The report concludes that 
sufficient resources and organizational stability are what paved the way for pro-
gress in the successful sectors.  
The influence of states and civil society in the Baltic 21 process is not evenly 
balanced. Nation-state representatives hold the most influential posts and, inten-
tionally or not, secure their influence by contributing most of the funding. This 
could be for practical reasons (e.g., capacity and legitimacy); nevertheless, it pre-
vents other sub-national or civil society stakeholders from gaining more influence. 
Furthermore, the present leadership is dominated by a small number of older EU 
member states. Given that Baltic 21 claims to be an all-inclusive process, giving 
equal status to all participants, it must overcome this bias in order to become as 
democratic and open as stated in its Agenda. The 2003 Baltic 21 report also 
addresses these issues and draws some substantial conclusions. It demands the 
general revision of Baltic 21’s mandate, visions, and indicators. The report 
acknowledges the inherent conflict of objectives between economic development 
and environmental goals, and identifies greater involvement in European and 
international sustainability processes as a solution.28 A new strategy for the Baltic 
21 process was proposed in spring 2004, with the vision to pursue sustainable 
development in the Baltic Sea Region by regional multi-stakeholder cooperation. 
Moreover, this proposal emphasizes the strengthening of cross-sectoral work and 
the development of a selected set of “Lighthouse Projects” which are designed to 
ensure high visibility and engage as many participating countries and sectors as 
possible in proving the added value of sustainable development (Baltic 21 Newsletter 
1/2004, p. 5; Baltic 21 press release 6 April 2004).  
The institutional arrangements for Baltic 21 differ substantially from the tradi-
tional forms of international governance (international regimes, intergovernmental 
cooperation) because the Agenda process is based on a concept of broad stake-
                                                                 
28 Baltic 21 has already taken some initial steps in this direction by contributing to the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, contributing to the European 
Environmental Ministers Conference in Kiev (“Environment for Europe Process”) in 2003, and 
by reaching out to initiate cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean Region and the United States 
(Baltic 21, 2003: 24). 
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holder participation including governmental (plus the EU) as well as non-
governmental actors. This is certainly due to its origin in Agenda 21, which also 
emphasizes the broad participation of non-governmental and sub-national actors. 
Baltic 21 has been especially successful in areas where local actors became directly 
involved, for example, in the area of city cooperation in the framework of Joint 
Action 4 which was carried out by the Union of the Baltic Cities.  
3.3 Governance by Transnational Networks: The Union of the Baltic 
Cities 
In recent years, many transnational networks have emerged in the Baltic Sea 
Region, giving rise to new forms of governance beyond the nation-state. Coopera-
tion is not restricted to civil society actors, but also encompasses collaboration 
between sub-national actors, that is, networks of cities and regions, which are 
often neglected in this context. In contrast to “governance by transnational policy 
networks” discussed above, “governance by transnational networks” is not limited 
to the involvement of non-governmental or sub-national actors in decision making 
or implementation. Emphasis is put on the fact that transnational networks “gov-
ern” their members and that policy convergence among their members can be 
achieved through new modes of internal network governance, which do not 
require governmental actors for decision making or implementation. Therefore, 
“governance by transnational networks” is a form of private governance “without 
the nation-state”. 
With the decrease in national sovereignty and growing limitations placed on 
national steering capacities, European municipalities’ scope for action is increasing. 
This means that towns and cities have the opportunity to enter the European and 
international political arena and develop into global players. Their participation is 
often actively supported by international and supranational bodies such as the 
European Commission, thus creating new “glocal”29 governance arrangements 
beyond the reach of nation-states, consequently further undermining national 
authority. At the same time, policymaking in municipalities is affected by global 
change (e.g., environmental challenges) and by decisions taken at supranational and 
international level. Thus, the international and transnational involvement of 
                                                                 
29 The term “glocal” is a combined expression stemming from “global” and “local”. It has 
become a catchword used to describe new governmental arrangements excluding nation-states 
and directly linking the local and international — i.e., global — level. 
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municipalities is imperative. Networking and collective articulation of interests is 
more essential than ever for actors at local level to make their voices heard in 
European or international contexts. Consequently, a large number of such organi-
zations have been established since the late 1980s (Kern 2001).30 
In line with similar international trends advanced political integration (through 
the EU in particular) obviously produces, in sum, post-national structures, which 
(1) facilitate and (2) require collaboration at sub-national level and across borders. 
These networks are generally characterized by a horizontal, polycentric, and non-
hierarchical structure.  
Cooperation among cities around the Baltic Sea31 displays specific features 
related to the long-standing tradition of their relationships. In this case, too, the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain was the impetus for the revival of transnational 
relations. For example, the first free municipal elections in Poland in June 1990 
provided Polish cities with new authority and legitimate self-governance. Thus, on 
the initiative of the mayors of Gdansk and Kalmar (in Sweden), a conference was 
held to establish an association of cities in the Baltic Sea Region. Then, in Septem-
ber 1991, the “Union of the Baltic Cities” (UBC) was founded in Gdansk by 32 
cities from 10 countries around the Baltic Sea. The UBC was set up as a general 
network, offering a platform and a “tool” for the activities and interests of its 
members “in a wide spectrum of spheres of interest”. The UBC considers itself 
primarily as an advocate of its members’ interests and “for the Baltic Sea Region as 
such” (UBC 2001: 4).32  
The UBC’s membership has more than tripled since its founding and, today, 
the organization has over 100 members, with almost 90% of the founding mem-
bers still participating. One possible, major reason for this dynamic development is 
that the UBC follows the tradition of the old Hanseatic League and is therefore 
probably particularly attractive to many former Hanseatic cities. A remarkable fact 
                                                                 
30 The Europe-wide network “Eurocities” was founded in 1986 on the initiative of Rotter-
dam, Barcelona, Frankfurt am Main, Milan, and Lyon. Regional networks of cities and towns were 
created in the Mediterranean and Alpine regions in 1991 and 1996 respectively; on “Medcities”, 
see <http://www.medcities.org> accessed on 19 September 2004; on the “Alliance in the Alps”, 
see Amor (1998 and 1999), Behringer (2003), and <http://www.alpenallianz.org> accessed on 
19 September 2004. 
31 On networking between cities in the Baltic Sea Region, see Groth (2001), Vartiainen 
(1998). 
32 On the Union of the Baltic Cities, see also Kern (2003), Lindström/Grönholm (2002), 
UBC (2001), Engström (1998), and Wohlgemuth (1998). 
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about the UBC is that cities from older EU member states and those from the 
newer member countries which have just recently acceded to the EU (formerly 
“transition states”) are quite evenly represented. The fact that the UCB was 
launched as a Swedish-Polish initiative was probably an important determinant in 
this respect. Moreover, joining the UBC was principally motivated not by specific 
characteristics33 of the municipalities involved (especially size), but rather by their 
sense of belonging to the Baltic Sea Region.34 
The UBC’s organizational differentiation is highly developed. Its most impor-
tant organs are the General Conference (which meets biannually), the Presidium 
(president and two vice presidents), the Executive Board, the Secretariat,35 and ten 
commissions. The commissions cover the entire range of (transnational) urban 
policy: (1) business cooperation, (2) culture, (3) education, (4) environment, 
(5) health and social affairs, (6) information society, (7) sports, (8) tourism, 
(9) transportation, and (10) urban planning. In addition, there are networks that 
fulfill cross-sectional functions, among them the Local Agenda 21 Network and 
the Women’s Network. An attempt is now being made to coordinate the activities 
of the commissions. To this end, regular meetings are held between commission 
chairs and the Executive Board. 
Although the UBC is not a network specializing in environmental issues, the 
sustainability principle was incorporated as a goal in its Statute and its Strategy.36 
Thus, sustainable development is considered as one of the UBC’s key policies. The 
Commission on Environment (EnvCom) was one of the first commissions estab-
lished in the UBC. EnvCom meets annually; it is the central body for implement-
ing strategies associated with sustainable development. In addition to this, the 
UBC also has a cross-sectional “Agenda 21 Working Group” whose task it is to 
                                                                 
33 Size and population are not exclusive criteria for entry into the UBC, as is the case with 
other municipal associations. In fact its members include very small towns like Bützow in 
Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania in Germany (population: 9,400) and Kärdla in Estonia (popu-
lation: 4,100), as well as the largest cities in the Baltic Sea Region, namely, St. Petersburg (popula-
tion: 4,730,000), Riga (population: 790,000), and Stockholm (population: 740,000). 
34 A glance at the statutes of the UBC shows that selection requirements are very liberal, as 
“[a]ny coastal city of the Baltic Sea and its Gulfs as well as any other city interested in the devel-
opment of the Baltic Sea Region may become a Member City of the Union.”  
35 The UBC Secretariat is located in Gdansk; it was financed by that city from the outset. 
36 See UBC Statute, Articles 1, 2 c and 2 f (UBC 2004: 93), <http://www.ubc.net/statues. 
html> accessed on 11 November 2004. Concerning the UBC Strategy, sustainability is mentioned 
several times; see, for example, the section devoted to the “UBC Agenda 21 Action Program” 
(UBC 2004: 98), <http://www.ubc.net/strategy.html> accessed on 11 November 2004. 
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coordinate UBC Member Cities’ Agenda 21 activities; the Working Group con-
venes two to three times a year. EnvCom and the Agenda 21 Working Group are 
both open to any and all interested UBC Member Cities. EnvCom and the Agenda 
21 Working Group are administered through a secretariat in Turku, which, thanks 
to third-party project funding (in particular from the EU and the Nordic Council), 
is better equipped than the UBC Secretariat in Gdansk.  
In its initial phase, the UBC functioned mainly as an initiator of cooperation 
between the cities of the Baltic Sea. The primary task in this context was to 
establish contacts and create a basis for collaboration. The municipalities in the 
post-communist countries lacked basic equipment in fundamental sectors (schools, 
hospitals, transport, etc.) and their means of communication were often deficient; 
therefore, the need for assistance in these areas was pressing. The first five years of 
the UBC were thus characterized by concrete activities to secure direct aid. By the 
late 1990s, the situation of the municipalities in the transition countries had 
improved so much that the UBC could shift its focus to other policies and fields 
of cooperation. By then, the Commissions were also becoming more differentiated 
and targeted in their work and new Commissions, for example, for Education and 
Urban Planning, were established (UBC 2001: 2).  
Work on the UBC’s Agenda 21 strategy also began in the late 1990s. The 
EnvCom working together with the Commission on Health and Social Affairs and 
the Women’s Network was highly involved in the formulation of the “UCB 
Agenda 21 Action Program”. This program was launched at the UBC General 
Conference in 1999; it was updated in 2001 and again in 2003. This program 
contains “policies, network service and project parts as well as … sustainability 
guidelines for member cities” (UBC 2002: 6). Worthy of note is that 85% of UBC 
Member Cities already pursue Local Agenda 21 activities on their own 
(Lindström/Grönholm 2002; Joas 2003). The UBC’s Agenda 21 Action Program 
is considered to be supplementary to those activities, providing service to UBC 
members and coordinating their various actions. Best practice exchange is high on 
the agenda and promoted via workshops, seminars, twinning, and the development 
of European Common Indicators for Urban Sustainable Development as bench-
marking tools. The “Best City Practices Project” (2000-2001) was re-launched and 
re-named “Transferring Best Environmental Solutions between Towns and Cities” 
(TBestC). TBestC’s task is to pair up (twin) suitable cities for mutual policy 
learning in environmental protection. An award scheme, the “Best Environmental 
Practice in the Baltic Cities Award”, complements this approach to enhance 
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benchmarking among member cities.37 So far, eleven projects have been carried 
out promoting sustainability in the Baltic cities in the framework of the Agenda 21 
Action Program.38  
All of the aforementioned activities indicate that the UBC is actively develop-
ing and implementing innovative measures for sustainable urban development in 
the participating cities. It is also active in representing its members in European 
and international policy arenas. This includes project-based cooperation with other 
networks like Eurocities39 as well as its involvement in the Baltic 21 process and 
HELCOM. In 2002, the UCB signed a cooperation agreement with Eurocities. 
Formalizing relations in this way is a response to the increasing need for better 
coordination among city networks. With the expansion of city networks, the 
streamlining of activities has become more important to avoid duplication and 
conflict, for instance, when competing for funds. 
At international level, the UBC was represented at the UN World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002). Further, the UBC has agreed to 
cooperate on a project with the “Local Authorities of Lake Victoria Region” in 
Africa.40 Internationally, however, special emphasis is placed on links with the 
European Union. The UBC promotes the appointment of EU coordinators in the 
municipal administrations to support UBC member cities in the European policy 
process, because this kind of professionalism increases the chances for cities to 
obtain EU funding.  
So far, the organization has been quite successful in attracting a balanced 
membership from all countries around the Baltic Sea. One problem with city 
networks in general, and the UBC in particular, is that they tend to attract munici-
palities which are already progressive, with the will and capacities to become 
involved in wider networks. Thus, laggard cities and towns may be left even 
further behind if they miss out on the opportunity to join such networks. A main 
concern for a regional network like the UBC is to involve local authorities from 
                                                                 
37 The scheme began in 1999; an award is granted every other year for the most outstanding 
environmental practice. 
38 For further information on the projects, see <http://www.ubc.net/commissions/ 
projects/projects.htm> accessed on 19 September 2004. 
39 Baltic Cities Bulletin 02/2002 <http://www.ubc.net/bulletin/bulletin2_02/p32.html> ac-
cessed on 9 June 2003.  
40 Baltic Cities Bulletin 01/2003 <http://www.ubc.net/bulletin/bulletin1_03/p45.html> ac-
cessed on 9 June 2003. 
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both ends of the spectrum — the laggards as well as the pioneers. Inclusiveness is 
a prerequisite for sustainable regional development. 
The UBC is, without a doubt, a good example of successful transnational 
(self-)governance beyond the nation-state. Furthermore, it displays in an exemplary 
fashion the novel features of such network organizations in maintaining transna-
tional relations at local level combined with an active outreach towards the Euro-
pean level. The increasing Europeanization of the UBC becomes apparent upon 
closer examination of the UBC Environmental Commission’s budget, which 
reveals that most of its projects are funded from EU resources (UBC 2003: 
111 f.).41 This is clear evidence for the Europeanization of this transnational 
network. 
4. The Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region 
All governance types discussed show the increasing importance of European 
governance in the Baltic Sea Region. The European Union has become a central 
actor in environmental governance and sustainable development in this region. 
Although it may not be a dominant actor in all respects, the EU’s position in 
decision making has been strengthened; it plays a prominent role in creating 
frameworks and standards, targeting the achievement of policy integration, and 
promoting certain policies through targeted funding. 
The role of the European Union in governance in the Baltic Sea Region is 
determined by the development of European environmental policy. In the early 
years,42 European environmental policy was based on a command and control 
approach, and executed via regulative policies (e.g., setting European standards 
and defining limits). Over the past three decades European environmental policy 
                                                                 
41 This tendency is not restricted to the Environmental Commission, although this Com-
mission is the most active and has been the most successful regarding project acquisitions. 
42 In 1973, the heads of state and government assigned the then European Community cer-
tain competence in the field of environmental policy. With the Single European Act (SEA) (1986) 
European environmental policy was given a legal basis. Successively, with the Treaties of Maas-
tricht and Amsterdam, European competence was further extended. With the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU) Qualified Majority Voting became the regular decision-making procedure 
in the Council of Environmental Ministers. For more details on the development of European 
Environmental Policy see Sbragia (2000: 296 ff.), and Hildebrand, Wilkinson, and Jordan (2002: 
13 ff.). 
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has developed into a “context-based” and integrated policy concept involving new 
instruments, including the participation of a wider group of stakeholders. The 
former top-down process has become more diffuse, reflecting the multi-layered 
nature of the European political system (cf. Jordan 2002; Knill 2003).  
Four aspects relevant to this development are of particular interest in the con-
text of this paper. The first of these is “subsidiarity”, one of the EU’s prime 
governance principles. This principle43 requires the EU to become active only if 
subordinated (national and sub-national) levels are not sufficiently equipped to 
respond to particular challenges or to implement certain policies. As a result, the 
incorporation of other, i.e., sub-national, levels of government into policy formula-
tion and implementation has proven necessary for successful policy implementa-
tion. 
The subsidiarity principle is closely related to the next point: the obvious 
implementation deficit in the area of European environmental policy. The debate 
about how to address this shortfall corresponds to similar ones at the national 
level. Despite all efforts, the EU has only been partially successful in implementing 
its environmental policy. A gap remains between administrative capacities and 
structural deficits in the member states (particularly in the case of the new mem-
bers). This sometimes makes it difficult to put EU legislation into practice at local 
and regional level. The more institutional change is required for compliance with 
EU policies, the less likely effective policy implementation becomes. These prob-
lems can only be resolved if a wide range of stakeholders is included in the policy 
process. The success of environmental policy depends on the “positive mobilize-
tion ability” (Knill 2003: 190) of affected and responsible actors. This insight 
opens the door to previously marginalized non-state actors from industry and civil 
society, and paves the way for new governance arrangements (Knill 2003: 192 ff.). 
Third, as a new EU objective, policy integration (Jordan and Lenschow 2000, 
Lafferty and Hovden 2003) is highly relevant to the achievement of sustainable 
development in the Baltic Sea Region. With respect to the horizontal dimension, 
this strategy affects the integration of sectoral policies such as energy, transport, 
and agriculture. However, policy integration also has a vertical dimension because 
                                                                 
43 The principle of subsidiarity was first legally established in the SEA only for the field of 
environmental policy. The TEU subsequently extended this principle to all policy fields. 
 – 25 – 
it “requires coordinated responses from all levels of government in the EU — 
European, national, regional and local” (Jordan and Lentschow 2000: 111).   
Fourth, in the White Paper on European Governance (European Commission 
2001), the EU aims at creating more openness, participation, coherence, and 
effectiveness. It calls for the active involvement of local and regional authorities, 
and for a more systematic dialogue with representatives from these levels through 
national and European associations. Thus, the Commission intends to shape 
policies more flexibly and, hence, responsive to “regional and local conditions” 
(European Commission 2001: 4). The Commission recently proposed holding 
dialogues prior to formal decision making. This would concern not only civil 
society actors but also associations of regional and local authorities.44 Although the 
concepts and proposals of the European Governance White Paper are certainly 
not new, they provide the EU with strategic governance guidelines for actual 
politics and policies, for the first time. For practical relevance guidelines still need 
to be translated into the EU policy concepts in a coherent way. 
All of these four factors are relevant to the governance of sustainable devel-
opment in the Baltic Sea Region. In contrast to the Helsinki Convention’s interna-
tional environmental policy approach, which was developed 30 years ago, Baltic 21 
as a sustainable development strategy covers seven economic sectors as well as 
education and spatial planning. In addition, it encompasses Joint Actions targeted 
at local-level implementation. Thus, the trends that can be observed in the Baltic 
Sea Region correspond with the overall development of EU policy.  
In addition to its direct involvement in policymaking, the EU was of particular 
importance to the new member countries in the pre-accession process. These 
countries were required to adopt the acquis communautaire, that is, to draft and 
implement new legislation compliant with EU standards, and to shape their poli-
cies to fulfill the conditions for EU membership. These measures and require-
ments represented a new foundation for environmental protection in these coun-
tries and throughout the entire Baltic region. Although the new member states still 
have much to catch up on, the EU has already begun to revamp its policies.  
                                                                 
44 Cf. Communication from the Commission: Dialogue with associations of regional and 
local authorities on the formulation of European Union policy, COM (2003) 811 final, 
19 December 2003. 
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In addition to its direct involvement in policymaking, the EU was of particular 
importance to its new member countries in the pre-accession phase. These coun-
tries were required to adopt the acquis communautaire, that is, to draft and implement 
new legislation in compliance with EU standards and to shape their policies 
accordingly, to fulfill the conditions for EU membership. These new requirements 
and measures created a new foundation for environmental protection in the 
accession countries and throughout the entire Baltic region. Although the new 
member states still have a lot of catching up to do, the path is irreversible. By 
joining the EU policymaking machinery, the new member states will be pushed 
forward. The role of the EU Commission, which has already changed and become 
more significant over the past several years, will continue to change. In some 
countries — for the Baltic Sea Region this applies especially to the new member 
states — environmental awareness is sorely lacking; there are only a small number 
of civil society groups concerned with environmental issues, and opposition to 
new environmental initiatives is strong. Hence, the positive mobilization required 
for successful environmental policy is often hindered by local conditions. 
The EU also targets the special needs of the northern regions of Europe, in 
particular, through the “Northern Dimension”. This program and its “Action 
Plan” are typical examples for the EU Commission’s new policy strategy. The 
Northern Dimension was first established for the years 2000 to 2003, and renewed 
for the period from 2004 to 2006. It  covers the EU’s northern neighbors (Poland 
and the Baltic countries being new EU members) and focuses in particular on 
Russia. Among other policy areas, it addresses and promotes, cross-border coop-
eration and environmental policy,45 pursuing a multi-stakeholder approach. The 
Northern Dimension relies on the willingness of partners; in its Second Action 
Plan, it calls for the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders (including NGOs 
and local authorities) and sets soft targets (e.g., monitoring and reduction of 
environmental pollution by toxic substances). The Second Northern Dimension 
Action Plan 2004-2006 outlines projects and areas of action in the annex, but 
delegates the details and specific activities to other actors.46 For example, the plan 
calls for the implementation of the “Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environ-
mental Action Programme” and signifies that cooperation with Russia is the 
                                                                 
45 With respect to Russia, nuclear safety is also a priority area.  
46 Second Northern Dimension Action Plan, 2004-2006, COM (2003) 343 final. 
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dominant strategic goal. The Northern Dimension itself will, in turn, be redefined 
in the context of the new neighborhood policy, the 2003 “Wider Europe” strategy. 
The EU has created a number of different regional policy instruments for pro-
jects in the Baltic Sea Region. These programs include INTERREG, TACIS, and 
PHARE, for cross-border cooperation in particular, and LIFE for the environ-
mental dimension. Each program has unique responsibilities, and targets specifi-
cally different groups of actors, countries, and projects. EU financing of projects in 
the Baltic Sea Region is done primarily with EU structural funds. Under the 
Northern Dimension umbrella, international financial institutions set up the 
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), which is supported by 
a special fund designated for environmental cooperation, in particular, with Russia. 
Whereas the recipients are highly appreciative of these resources, anger is also 
widespread about the bureaucratic application procedures and the incompatibility 
of various instruments. HELCOM, Baltic 21, and UBC projects are funded 
through other EU programs.  
The three case studies have shown, therefore, that the European Union is di-
rectly involved in decision making as a stakeholder: it is a signatory of HELCOM, 
it was involved in the initiation of Baltic 21 and, as an SOG member, it remains a 
partner in the Baltic 21 process. The European Union is generally responsive to 
the needs and challenges of sustainable development, on the one hand, and to 
European governance, on the other. It tries to address these goals by means of 
new governance arrangements and by assigning a greater role to non-state actors 
and, to a certain extent, by mainstreaming their involvement in the policy process. 
However, the soft policy approach taken by the EU on certain issues, for example, 
within the Northern Dimension, could also be questioned. Therefore, in some 
areas, a regulative approach promises better outcomes. Sustainable development 
needs a broad base of support at all levels of government. In this respect the 
integrative approach of Baltic 21 seems to fit very well into the overall European 
strategy.47 The European approach of using a combination of “old” and “new” 
instruments can generally be considered to be on the right track, although it is not 
as successful as it could and should be. Despite the shortcomings, however, the 
                                                                 
47 This is not very surprising because Baltic 21 as well as the EU’s strategies for sustainable 
development are based on Agenda 21. 
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EU is a relevant actor, an important partner, and an influential promoter of sus-
tainable development in the Baltic Sea Region. 
5. Conclusions: Transnationalization versus Europeanization of 
the Baltic Sea Region 
Based on the analysis of the different types of governance in the Baltic Sea Region, 
it is now possible to conclude that nation-states are not obsolete and will continue 
to play an important role in the sustainable development of the region. However, 
national governance has its limits and new forms of governance beyond the 
nation-state are crucial for the future development of the region. The general 
development can be characterized by both, the transnationalization and the Euro-
peanization of the Baltic Sea Region.  
With regard to the traditional mode of governance beyond the nation-state, 
that is, international regimes, the most striking difference between the situation in 
the 1980s and the present situation is the strong position of the European Union 
within this international regime. The question remains as to the extent to which 
nation-states are willing to grant stakeholders access to decision-making. 
HELCOM clearly shows that stakeholders are not fully integrated into policy 
formulation, which remains under the authority of the nation-states (and the EU). 
This can be considered as typical for an international regime created 30 years ago. 
Even so, it is also obvious that HELCOM has been undergoing considerable 
change: governmental actors increasingly seek support from non-governmental 
actors for specific projects, particularly at local and regional level (e.g., the elimina-
tion of “hot spots”). This means at least that non-governmental actors are gaining 
in significance in the area of regime implementation.  
In contrast to HELCOM, Baltic 21 was designed as a multi-stakeholder net-
work from the outset. The need for the broad participation of all relevant groups 
was recognized as essential for the success of the Baltic-type Agenda 21, which is 
directly related to Agenda 21 as adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and which 
stresses multi-stakeholder approaches for all Agenda 21 processes. Thus, the 
emergence of a new governance approach — that is, a transnational policy net-
work — would seem to have been triggered primarily by international develop-
ments. The fact that Baltic 21 was the first regional Agenda 21 process can be 
explained by the unique situation that prevailed in the Baltic Sea Region at the end 
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of the Cold War. The region was in flux from the early 1990s onward, and, as a 
result, innovative approaches like Agenda 21 had a better chance of coming to 
fruition there. Nevertheless, deficits remain, which concern not only the general 
goals, but also the multi-level approach taken by the Agenda. On the one hand, 
nation-states (and the European Union) clearly dominate the Baltic 21 network: 
important positions are assigned to representatives of national governments. On 
the other hand, Baltic 21 projects appear to be most successful when carried out 
by actors like the UBC which have particular competences and expertise in specific 
fields. The implementation of Agenda 21 is impeded by its strong reliance on 
national capacities, which are not evenly distributed among the countries in the 
region. The lack of national capacities may be compensated by the capacities of 
transnational non-governmental actors, and Baltic 21 could become more success-
ful through the even greater integration of actors like the UBC.  
Networks like Baltic 21 and the UBC can develop capacities and instruments 
for implementation that cannot be created through intergovernmental cooperation 
alone. This fact should be emphasized with regard to local environmental policies 
in particular. By choosing the sustainable development of the Baltic Sea Region as 
an important goal for its organization, a general network organization such as the 
UBC can foster the understanding of these issues among its various member cities. 
The UBC has developed a transnational identity of its own and has stronger ties 
with Brussels than with the national capitals in the region. By providing hands-on 
support and service for their member cities, a transnational network such as the 
UBC can complement the traditional modes of governance adopted by nation-
states — that is, international regimes and intergovernmental cooperation. How-
ever, nation-states may be reluctant to support such transnational networks, 
because the latter could affect and weaken the position of the former. 
Our study clearly shows that new governance arrangements are influenced by 
the European Union, which has become a strong political player in the Baltic Sea 
Region, mainly through its direct involvement in international decision making 
(HELCOM, Baltic 21), through European regulations (especially via directives) 
which aim at national governments, and through the funding of selected projects. 
Since sustainable development needs a broad base of support at all levels of 
government, Baltic 21’s integrative approach seems to fit very well into the overall 
European strategy. Moreover, the EU has started to cooperate directly with trans-
national networks like the UBC and most of the funding for the UBC Environ-
ment Commission’s projects is provided by the EU. The influence of the EU has 
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been increasing steadily, and organizations like the UBC have become players in 
the European multi-level system and developed strong ties with Brussels. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the achievement of sustainable devel-
opment in the Baltic Sea Region undoubtedly requires a productive combination 
of national governance and new forms of governance beyond the nation-state. In 
this respect, transnational policy networks, such as Baltic 21, and transnational 
networks, such as the UBC, represent promising new approaches that can com-
plement the traditional cooperation between nation-states via international regimes 
or intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, the governance of the Baltic Sea 
Region is becoming more and more embedded in European governance, which 
will lead to the Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region. 
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